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 I.    The Elements and Significance of Agency Relationships 
 This Chapter identifies the fiduciary principles that are integral to agency relationships as 
defined by the common law and explores their implications. In contrast with relationships in 
which a fact-specific assessment of a relationship and its circumstances triggers the application 
of fiduciary duties, agency relationships are categorically treated as fiduciary.1 For the most part, 
the Chapter focuses on common law, albeit referring at points to statutes and regulations 
applicable to specific agency relationships. Beyond the scope of this chapter, comprehensive 
codifications define and govern some specific relationships;2 in some contexts regulators 
articulate fiduciary duties otherwise owed by agents within the scope of the regulation.3 
Likewise, although the common-law definition of agency encompasses employees,4 employment 
relationships as such are not the focus of this Chapter.  
 The Chapter’s geographical focus is confined to the United States. Within the broader 
common-law tradition, agency-law doctrine may differ less across national jurisdictions than is 
true for other subjects. In the United States, state-by-state variations are muted, especially so for 
                                                
1. For this distinction, see Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller, Introduction, in Philosophical Foundations of 
Fiduciary Law 1, 2-3 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014). See also Daniel B. Kelly, Fiduciary Principles 
in Fact-Based Fiduciary Relationships, in this volume. 
 
2. See, e.g., Nina Kohn, Fiduciary Principles in Surrogate Decisionmaking, in this volume.  
 
3. See Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Principles in Investment Advice, in this volume. 
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the fiduciary principles canvassed by this Chapter. In the seven states in which legislation 
codifies many general doctrines of agency law, outcomes in cases often do not differ from 
outcomes reached by courts applying the common law.5 The three successive Restatements of 
Agency issued by the American Law Institute have been significant forces operating toward 
doctrinal convergence across states.6 Relatedly, the Restatements have, for agency law, served as 
authoritative scholarly resources comparable to authored treatises that dominate in other fields.7 
 When a relationship of common-law agency links two persons, one person’s actions can 
directly carry legal significance for the other. As this Chapter illustrates, agency doctrine is 
salient in many settings. A “principal” is charged with the legal consequences of the conduct of 
an “agent” when the agent acts within the scope of authority conferred by the principal or 
reasonably appears so to act from the perspective of third parties with whom the agent interacts. 
Agency doctrine defines and imposes formal structure on consensual relationships in which one 
actor has legally-consequential power to represent the other, encompassing externally-oriented 
consequences for the principal, the agent, and third parties, as well as internally-oriented rights 
and duties between principal and agent. An agent functions, not as a substitute for the principal, 
                                                                                                                                                       
4. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01, cmt c (2006). On employees as fiduciaries, see Aditi Bagchi, Fiduciary 
Principles in Employment Law, in this volume. 
 
5. The seven states are Alabama, California, Georgia, Louisiana, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota. See 
Ala. Code § 8-2-1 to -9; Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2019 to -22; 2026 to -30; 2295 to 2300; 2304 to –39; 2342 to –45; 2349 
to -51; 2355-57; Ga. Code §§ 10-6-1 to –6; 10-6-20 to -39; 10-6-50 to -64; 10-6-80 to -89; 10-6-100 to -102;10-6-
120 to -122; La Civ. Code Art. 2985-3032; Mont. Code Ann. §§ 28-10-101 to –105; 28-10-201 to –215; 28-10-301 
to – 303; 28-10-401 to -423; 28-10-501 to -503; 28-10-601 to -609; 28-10-701 to -704; 28-10-801 to –802; N.D. 
Cent. Code §§3-01-01 to –11; 3-02-01 to -16; 3-03-01 to -09; 3-04-01 to -03; 3-05-01 to -02; 3-06-01 to -06; S.D. 
Codif. Laws ch 59-1 to -9; 59-2-1 to -7; 59-3-1 to -18; 59-4-1 to -2; 59-5-1 to -3; 59-6-1 to -10; 59-7-1 to -8; 59-8-1 
to -2; 59-9-1 to -8.  
 
6. Restatement of Agency (1933); Restatement (Second) of Agency (1958); Restatement (Third) of Agency (2006). 
7. Apart from the Restatements, the last comprehensive treatment of agency law specific to the United States was a 
two-volume work published in 1914. See Floyd R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Agency (West Pub. Co., 2d 
ed. 1914). 
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but as an extension of the principal’s legal personality in dealings with third parties and other 
externally-oriented conduct within the scope of the agency relationship, including knowledge of 
facts acquired by the agent when material to the agent’s duties to the principal.8 The potentially 
grave impact for the principal underlies the requisites that define an agency relationship, 
including its fiduciary character. The requisites for agency relationships also reflect the 
implications for personal autonomy when one person represents another. 
Perhaps moreso than for other canonical fields within fiduciary law, the law’s 
terminology for agency relationships differs from usage elsewhere. In social-science and 
humanities scholarship, “agency,” “agent-principal relationship,” and “representation” often 
diverge from the meaning ascribed by the law.9 One explanation is that theoretical accounts of 
agency law should reflect the fact that agency doctrine itself has multiple focal points that 
incorporate externally-oriented legal consequences stemming from an agent’s conduct. Within 
the law, agency occupies a specific doctrinal category in which agents represent other persons; in 
economics scholarship, agent-principal relationships capture a wide range of relationships in 
which one actor’s conduct actions may affect another actor’s interests in many ways, not 
necessarily through legally-consequential representation.  
 
1.   Requisites for common-law agency 
                                                
8. Deborah A. DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency and the Interpretation of Instructions in Philosophical 
Foundations 321, 322 (hereinafter DeMott, Fiduciary Character). 
 
9. For the classic definition in economics, see Michael Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308-309 (1976)(“[w]e define an agency 
relationship as one in which one or more persons (the principals) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decisionmaking authority to the agent”). In philosophy and 
humanities scholarship more generally, “agency” is a property ascribed to subject to whom purposes and desires can 
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 As defined by the common law, “[a]gency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when 
one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act 
on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or 
otherwise consents so to act.”10 Both the fiduciary character of the relationship and the 
principal’s control over the agent are essential requisites for an agency relationship. The 
Supreme Court recognized their constitutive nature in Hollingsworth v. Perry, holding that the 
proponents of a successful ballot initiative to amend the California constitution were not agents 
of the state or its citizens and thus under the federal Constitution lacked standing to defend the 
amendment in federal court when state officials declined to do so.11 Observed a majority of the 
Court, “the most basic features of an agency relationship are missing here:” the proponents owed 
no fiduciary duties to California and, in conducting the litigation, were not subject to the state’s 
control or that of its citizens.12 More generally, the requisite that the principal possess a right or 
power to control an agent differentiates agency from other fiduciary relationships. Although the 
nature of the principal’s control varies across agency relationships, a principal has power to 
furnish interim instructions to an agent—and indeed to terminate the agent’s authority—albeit in 
breach of contract.13 The agent’s fiduciary duty to the principal furnishes a benchmark for the 
                                                                                                                                                       
be attributed. See Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I 99 (1985). In philosophical 
inquiry into the arts, ‘representation’ implies denotation. Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art 25 (1968). 
    
10. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01. 
 
11. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
  
12. Hollingsworth, 133 S Ct at 2666-67. The Court’s holding is controversial as a statement of federal standing 
doctrine. See Fred O. Smith, Jr, Undemocratic Restraint, 70 Vand. L. Rev. 845, 899-900 (2017) (characterizing 
Hollingsworth as “a remarkable opinion” that constitutionalizes “the question of who can represent the state’s 
interests,” disregarding a prior determination by the California Supreme Court that the initiative’s proponents had 
standing to defend its constitutionality).  
 
13. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01, cmt c.  
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agent’s interpretation of instructions received from the principal, linking the fiduciary character 
of the relationship to the principal’s power of control.14   
 Although agency is a consensual relationship, the label that parties assign to their 
relationship is not determinative. Nonetheless, how the parties refer to a relationship’s functional 
characteristics may be relevant to the legal determination of whether a relationship of agency 
exists. This determination generally is a mixed question of law and fact.15 When the parties’ 
agreement explicitly disclaims any fiduciary duties, if the agreement also constructs the essential 
structure of an agency relationship, the disclaimer cannot oust fiduciary duties.16 A court 
considers the overall purpose of the agreement; if it is to enable one party to take legally salient 
action on behalf of the other and subject to the other’s control, disclaimers of agency are 
ineffectual and do not oust fiduciary duties.17 Creating a relationship of common-law agency 
generally does not require compliance with legally-specified formalities, such as the execution of 
a written instrument or a contract.18 However, when a principal confers authority on an agent to 
enter into types of agreements or transactions for which the law requires a writing signed by the 
party to be charged, a principle of “equal dignity” requires that a writing signed by the principal 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
14. DeMott, Fiduciary Character, supra n. 8, at 321. 
 
15. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.02. 
 
16. Patriarch Partners Agency Services, LLC v. Zohar CDO 2003-I, Ltd., __ F. Supp. 3d ___ (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 
2017) [2017 WL 1535385 at * __]; EBC I v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5 N.Y. 3d 11, 20 (2005)(fiduciary duty results 
from relation between parties and is “not dependent solely upon an agreement or contractual relation between 
them”).  
 
17. Samba Enters., LLC v. iMesh, Inc., 2009 WL 705537 at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y., Mar 19 2009).  
 
18. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 cmt. d.  
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evidence the agent’s authority.19  
 
2.   Defining the scope of agency relationships 
 When an agent deals with a third party, the robust doctrine of apparent authority 
disallows operative effect to restrictions privately imposed by the principal on the agent’s actual 
authority that contravene manifestations made by the principal to the third party or restrict the 
agent’s authority when the agent has acted consistently with customary industry practice. 
However, as between themselves, the parties to an agency relationship may define its scope 
through exclusion, as by specifying domains in which the agent may act free of fiduciary duties 
to the principal. Separately, the law recognizes the possibility that another type of legal 
relationship may exist contemporaneously with an agency relationship. For example, as a 
standard matter, an agent may have a right to assert a lien over the principal’s property to secure 
the principal’s payment of agreed-to compensation for the agent’s services.20 Likewise, a 
securities broker who lends funds to a client via a margin account becomes the client’s creditor. 
If a broker liquidates an under-margined account as permitted by the account agreement, the 
result may be deleterious to the client and the client may object, but the broker has exercised its 
rights as the client’s creditor, beyond the reach of any agency-law duty owed to the client as the 
broker’s principal.21  
 Sometimes contractual exclusions from the scope of agency relationships minimize the 
                                                
19. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.02. 
 
20. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.01, cmt c. 
 
21. For a full discussion, see Deborah A. DeMott, Defining Agency and Its Scope II, in Comparative Contract Law: 
British and American Perspectives 396, 403 (Larry A. DiMatteo & Martin Hogg, eds. 2016)(hereinafter DeMott, 
Scope). 
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scope in which an agent’s fiduciary duty has operative effect. In auctions of art objects, the 
consignor of a work to an auction house becomes a principal in a relationship of agency in which 
the house acts as the consignor’s agent. Commonly delineated in a written consignment 
agreement, the terms of the parties’ relationship are subject to the terms of the house’s standard 
contract with purchasers (the house’s conditions of sale, limited warranty, and guarantee). 
Consignment agreements give the house discretion to consult experts, which the house may 
exercise over a consignor’s explicit objections.22 Consignment agreements also give the house 
discretion to rescind contracts when the house determines in good faith it may be subject to 
liability to a purchaser for breach of its warranty because a catalog description—such as an 
attribution to a named artist—is inaccurate.23 In both examples, the auction house as consignee 
acts pursuant to rights defined by contract that lie outside the scope of its fiduciary duties to the 
consignor, its principal. These contractually-defined rights may be exercised contrary to the 
principal’s instructions and to its detriment.24      
 The scope of a common-law agency relationship may also be salient in a context 
governed by statute. The statute’s structure and purpose are relevant to whether an agent as 
defined by the common law should also be treated an “agent” when the statute uses that term. In 
Segal v. Genitrix, an LLC’s former president sued two investors who were formerly members of 
the LLC’s board of directors on the premise that they were subject to personal liability for his 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
22. Reale v. Sotheby’s, 718 NYS 2d 37 (App. Div. 2000). 
  
23. Greenwood v. Koven, 880 F. Supp. 186 (SDNY, 1995). Greenwood holds that the house’s exercise of discretion 
must be motivated by at least a subjectively-held belief that the sale could subject the house to liability. 
 
24. For further discussion of art-auction cases, see DeMott, Scope, supra n. 21, at 404-407. 
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unpaid wages under the Massachusetts Wage Act.25 The act imposes liability on “officers or 
agents having the management” of a company. Neither defendant served the company as an 
executive officer. One defendant, designated a third party beneficiary in the president’s 
employment agreement, held power to act as the company’s agent to enforce the agreement, 
including its termination; and the evidentiary record supported an inference that he spoke for the 
other defendant and thus acted as his agent. The court held that the limited scope of these agency 
relationships did not make defendants “agents having the management of the company” as the 
Wage Act requires. Although as investors the defendants had leverage over the company’s 
business—in particular over the investment of new funds—such control is not equivalent to the 
position of an agent charged with managing the company. Establishing that an individual director 
(or investor) held such a position requires showing that the company’s board of directors 
conferred authority on the individual of the scope required by Wage Act.26 
 
3.   A state of agency-in-waiting?  
 An agent’s duties to the principal are generally coterminous with the agency relationship, 
which places pre-agency dealings between an eventual agent and principal on an arms-length 
footing.27 But the absence of an agency relationship does not mean that the parties owe each 
other no duties of any sort. For example, an employee of a brokerage firm may defraud investors 
who are not formally clients of the firm, acting without either actual or apparent authority to bind 
the firm and through transactions that are explicitly not conducted through the firm. In the 
                                                
25. Segal v. Genitrix, 87 N.E.3d 560 (Mass. 2017). The Wage Act is Mass. Gen. L c. 149, § 148.  
 
26. 87 N.E.3d at 576. 
 
27. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.01, cmt. c. 
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brokerage context, venerable authority holds that an agency relationship begins when a client 
places an order and the broker agrees to execute it.28 If the firm acted negligently in hiring and 
supervising the employee—perhaps one whose prior history made foreseeable the exploitation of 
investors through the vehicle of employment—the firm would be subject to liability via a tort 
theory.29  
 Pre-agency duties can be conceptualized in three possible ways. First, any pre-agency 
duties arise from another body of law, as in the bad-broker example. Second, pre-agency duties 
could require a fact-specific determination that the relationship between the prospective agent 
and principal involved trust and confidence to a degree that justifies assessing the prospective 
agent’s conduct against fiduciary standards.30 Third, prospective agency itself (the state of 
“agency-in-waiting”) itself could trigger fiduciary duties, which calls into question whether the 
trigger operates only when an agency relationship eventually links the parties. The second and 
third theories would require determining the extent of the agent’s duties. In assessing these three 
possibilities, one might metaphorically recall the choice that confronts a purchaser of a switch to 
control an electric light: an on-off toggle function, or a dimmer control that enables changes in 
brightness. 
 In Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., a class action brought by commodity investors, 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
28. Le Marchant v. Moore, 150 N.Y. 209 (1896). For a more recent statement, see In re Enron Corp. Sec., 
Derivative & “ERISA’ Litig., 238 F. Supp. 3d 799, 843 (S.D. Tex. 2017)(broker’s fiduciary duties in 
nondiscretionary account begin when client places order and ends when broker executes it, in contrast to relationship 
in which broker manages account on a discretionary basis or serves as a financial advisor to client).  
 
29. For a recent example, see Owens v. Stifel Nicholaus & Co., 650 Fed. App’x 764 (11th Cir. 2016). The same 
theory underlies the liability of a burglar alarm company that hires a known violent felon as a door-to-door salesman 
when the salesman kidnaps a prospective customer. Underberg v. Southern Alarm, Inc., 643 S.E. 2d 374, 375 (Ga. 
App. Ct. 2007). 
 
30. See Daniel B. Kelly, Fiduciary Principles in Fact-Based Fiduciary Relationships, in this volume. 
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the court held that a commodities broker had a fiduciary duty to explain the nature of its 
commission and fee structures to prospective clients in light of their complexity and the 
inaccessibility of relevant information from other sources.31 The court’s reasoning spans the 
second and third theories outlined above, stressing that “where the very creation of the agency 
relationship involves a special trust and confidence on the part of the principal in the subsequent 
fair dealing of an agent, the prospective agent may be under a fiduciary duty to disclose the terms 
of his employment as an agent.”32 Thus, whether a prospective agent owes fiduciary duties—in 
Martin a duty of disclosure concerning commission and fee terms—to a prospective principal 
turns on a specific reason for informational asymmetry, present when the prospective principal 
uniquely depends on the prospective agent.  
 The opaque commission and fee structures in Martin do not exhaust the range of 
potentially problematic conduct that may precede or anticipate an agency relationship. Still 
within the commodities realm, regulation requires that firms adopt internal prohibitions against 
“front running” by commodities brokers, that is, practices that prioritize trades in proprietary 
accounts or accounts in which the broker has an interest ahead of executable customer orders in 
the same commodity.33 As discussed more formally below, by front-running a customer order an 
agent competes with its principal, which contravenes the agent’s duty of loyalty unless the 
principal consents. Front-running can also injure the principal when the agent’s prior transaction 
is sizable enough to move the market price. If the agent profits through the strategy, the agent 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
31. 643 N.E.2d 734, 741 (Ill. 1994). 
 
32. Id. at 740. 
 
33. 17 C.F.R. §§ 155.2-.4. 
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nets more than the commission to which the principal agreed from its association with the agent. 
 In contrast, suppose a prospective client who has not established a commodity futures 
trading account requests a quote from a broker in anticipation, for example, of making a large 
block purchase. As a commodities intermediary, the broker has access to information the 
prospective client lacks, including real-time market information as well as impending client 
order flows for cheese futures contracts. Commodities regulation contains no explicit prohibition 
on “trading ahead” of a prospective client on the basis of a request for a quote, given its reliance 
on a customer’s “executable order” to trigger regulation. However, commodities regulation now 
includes a prohibition on insider trading (narrower than that applicable to insider trading in 
securities) that proscribes the use of misappropriated information in breach of a pre-existing 
duty, which does not require that the information be that of a client or customer.34 Thus, the 
reasoning in Martin could ground liability when the nature of the request for a quote necessitated 
that the prospective client repose trust and confidence in the broker, and arguably whether or not 
the prospective client places an order.  
 Unlike the broker in Martin and brokers who front-run client orders (or employee brokers 
who front-run their employer’s trading plans), a broker who indulges in anticipatory front-
running on the basis of requests for quotes assumes the risk of undertaking an illiquid position in 
a commodity if no orders follow requests for quotes. This fact—inherent in the economics of 
                                                
 
34. Commodities Exchange Act §§ 4b(a) and (C); 7 USC §§ 6b and (c ). The Dodd-Frank Act amended the language 
of section 6 (c)  in 2010 to grant the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) authority to prohibit the use 
of manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances in contravention of CFTC regulations. The amendment 
imposes no affirmative disclosure obligations except when necessary to prevent or correct a misleading statement. 
The CFTC brought and settled its first insider trading proceedings in 2015 and 2016, both against traders who front-
ran their employers’ proprietary trading plans. In re Motazedi, CFTC No. 16-02 (Dec 2, 2015) and In re Ruggles, 
CFTC No. 16-34 (Sept. 29, 2016). 
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front-running—may undercut the likelihood of showing that a prospective client, in requesting a 
quote, reposed a sufficient degree of trust and confidence in the broker. More generally, duties in 
the context of pre-agency dealings likely do not arise in bright-line fashion and are triggered by 
circumstances that function more like dimmer switches than toggles.            
 
      II.    An Agent’s Duties to the Principal 
 Contemporary accounts of agency doctrine differentiate among an agent’s duties to the 
principal, distinguishing duties of loyalty from duties of performance.35 Some of an agent’s 
duties of performance are distinctive to agency; older accounts termed this category “duties of 
service and obedience.”36 Several discrete duties within this category facilitate and support an 
agent’s loyalty to the principal. A further dimension of agency doctrine defines the category of 
subagency, which applies to relationships in which an agent appoints a person to perform 
functions that the agent has consented to perform on behalf of the agent’s principal and for 
whose conduct the appointing agent is responsible to the principal.37 A subagent is bound by the 
duties the appointing agent owes to the principal; the subagent also owes fiduciary duties to the 
appointing agent.38 Thus, in the brokerage examples above, individual actors who execute trades 
and perform other agency functions on behalf of firm clients are subagents of the brokerage firm, 
and the firm itself is the client’s agent.39 Within organizations that furnish agency services—like 
                                                
35. Restatement (Third) of Agency §§ 8.02-8.05 (duties of loyalty); §§ 8.07-8.12. 
 
36. Restatement (Second) of Agency ch. 13, tit. B (§§ 377-386). 
 
37. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.15(1). 
 
38. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.15 cmt. d. 
 
39. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.15 cmt b. Coagents, in contrast, share one common principal. Id.  
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brokerage firms—the principal has opportunities, often coupled with duties imposed by 
regulation, to institute mechanisms that further compliance with duties owed by its personnel to 
clients as principals.   
 
1. Duties of loyalty  
 An agent owes the principal four distinct duties of loyalty. Uniting all is an overarching 
fiduciary principle: the agent’s “duty to act loyally for the principal’s benefit in all matters 
connected with the agency relationship.”40 These duties apply regardless of whether an agent has 
access to property of the principal and whether an agent’s functions require the exercise of 
discretion. As discussed below, a principal may consent to conduct that would otherwise breach 
a duty of loyalty, but the principal’s consent does not relieve the agent of all duties, in particular 
duties to deal with the principal fairly and in good faith. 
 First among these well-established duties, an agent has a duty not to acquire a “material 
benefit” from a third party through the agent’s use of the agent’s position, including in 
connection with transactions effected on the principal’s behalf or other actions taken on the 
principal’s behalf.41 Thus, an agent who takes a bribe from a third party in connection with a 
transaction conducted on the principal’s behalf breaches the agent’s duty of loyalty. The agent is 
subject to liability although the principal cannot demonstrate harm and although the agent did not 
believe the principal would be harmed.42 Although most “material benefits” are, like monetary 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
40. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.01. 
 
41. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.02. 
 
42. For a recent example, see Samba Enters., LLC v. iMesh, Inc., 2009 WL 705537 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2009), aff’d, 
390 Fed. App’x 55 (2d Cir. 2010)(firm, characterized by court as serving as an agent, engaged to find suitable 
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bribes, direct and pecuniary in nature, the duty also encompasses subtler benefits, such as a 
corporate officer’s receipt of the opportunity to purchase IPO shares from the IPO’s underwriter 
as a token of gratitude and in anticipation of business relationships with the corporation in the 
future.43 
 Second, an agent has a duty not to self-deal with the principal, that is, “not to deal with 
the principal as or on behalf of an adverse party in a transaction connected with the agency 
relationship.”44 So to deal places the agent’s (or the third party’s) interests in irreconcilable 
tension with the principal’s interests and undercuts the consensual quality of the agent’s 
representation of the principal. If self-dealing is customary for agents in a particular industry, but 
the principal is unaware of the custom, by retaining an agent in the industry the principal has not 
consented to the self-dealing custom.45 Dual agency—representing an additional principal in 
conducting a transaction between them—breaches this duty. Some cases exclude “ministerial 
acts” from the prohibition on dual agency, defining such acts as those involving no exercise of 
judgment, discretion, or skill on behalf of the additional principal.46 
 Third, an agent has a duty throughout the duration of an agency relationship to refrain 
from competing with the principal and from taking action on behalf of or otherwise assisting the 
                                                                                                                                                       
business partner for client; firm entered into undisclosed side agreement with company to which it referred client, 
receiving a fee from the identified partner for referring it to the client).  
 
43. In re eBay, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2004 WL 253521 (Del. Ch. Feb. 11, 2004). 
 
44. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.03. 
 
45. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.03, cmt. b. 
 
46. Bernstein v. Centaur Ins. Co., 644 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Olsen v. Vail Assocs Real Estate, Inc., 
935 P2d 975, 980-981 (Colo. 1997). 
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principal’s competitors.47 An agent-competitor acts adversely to the principal, albeit without self-
dealing, breaching a duty of loyalty even when the principal cannot demonstrate harm. 
Competition by agents is often facilitated—and competitive injury worsened—by the agent’s 
access to and use of the principal’s confidential information.48 Unless the agent has agreed 
otherwise, this duty terminates with the agency relationship. 
 Fourth, an agent has a duty not to use the principal’s property for the agent’s own 
purposes or those of a third party, nor may the agent use or communicate confidential 
information of the principal for the agent’s own purposes or those of a third party.49 Unlike the 
duty to refrain from competition with the principal, duties concerning the principal’s property 
and confidential information endure after the agency relationship terminates.50 A subagent, like 
the appointing agent, owes the principal a duty of confidentiality, even when the subagent has 
not executed a confidentiality agreement. In Veleron Holding, B.V. v. Morgan Stanley, the 
defendant investment bank served as a lender’s disposal agent for stock that the plaintiff had 
pledged as collateral for a loan to buy the stock.51 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
breached its fiduciary duty by selling the stock short when in possession of nonpublic 
information that the lender was likely to issue a margin call that the shareholder would be unable 
to meet. The court held that under the circumstances the investment bank as “disposal agent” 
                                                
47. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.04. 
 
48. For a recent non-US example, see Lifeplan Australia Friendly Soc. Ltd. v. Ancient Order of Foresters [2017] 
FCAFC 74. In Lifeplan, two senior employees of the plaintiff acted on behalf of the defendant, while still employed 
by the plaintiff, to tie down business for the defendant and then, armed with the plaintiff’s customer lists, resigned 
and became employees of the defendant.  
 
49. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.05. 
 
50. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.05, cmts b and c.  
 
51. 117 F. Supp. 3d 404 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
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could owe a fiduciary duty to the lender as its principal. Alternatively, the lender owed the 
shareholder a duty of confidentiality that could bind the disposal agent as the lender’s subagent 
notwithstanding the absence of any confidentiality agreement between the lender and the 
disposal agent.52     
 The general overarching principle of loyalty itself can impose fiduciary constraints on an 
agent, as illustrated by issues that arise when an agent abandons its functions on behalf of a 
principal. The consensual nature of an agency relationship means that either agent or principal 
may terminate the relationship at any time through a manifestation made to the other, a 
manifestation of renunciation if from the agent or of revocation if from the principal.53 The 
agent’s power to renounce can enable a now-former agent to engage in conduct that would 
otherwise breach the agent’s fiduciary duties to the principal. As the discussion of “agents-in-
waiting” demonstrates, determining just when an actor becomes subject to an agent’s fiduciary 
duties may sometimes require closer scrutiny. Likewise, the end of an agency relationship may 
not terminate all of agency’s consequences.54 Consider the implications when an agent makes no 
manifestation of renunciation to the principal but simply ceases to perform. A fundamental 
consequence of agency—examined more fully below—charges the principal with knowledge of 
facts learned by the agent that are material to the agent’s duties. In some contexts, inaction itself 
carries legal consequences, including the waiver of rights that must be exercised in a timely 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
52. 117 F. Supp. 3d at 455 (a “woeful omission,” according to the court but one “of no moment”). 
 
53. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.10(1). 
 
54. Among these consequences is the prospect that the agent may continue to deal with third parties purportedly on 
behalf of the principal. An agent’s apparent (as opposed to actual) authority terminates only when it is no longer 
reasonable for the  third party with whom the agent deals to believe that the agent continues to act with actual 
authority. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.11(2).   
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fashion. Abandoning a principal without notice is inconsistent with the overarching duty of 
loyalty to which an agent is subject. Inaction—the failure to notify the principal—if a voluntary 
act on the agent’s part breaches the agent’s duty of loyalty. Abandonment severs the 
representative relationship between agent and principal.55        
  
2. Duties of performance 
 Although fiduciaries’ duties are conventionally categorized into compartments of 
“loyalty” and “care,” the taxonomy of agency duties is complex and reticulated. In particular, an 
agent owes a suite of duties of care, competence, and diligence. Additionally, an agent is subject 
to a distinctive duty to comply with lawful instructions received from the principal, to be sure a 
duty of performance but one inseparably linked to the agent’s overarching duty to act loyally on 
behalf of the principal as the principal’s representative. Further facilitating the principal’s 
exercise of control, an agent owes another distinctive duty, which is to use reasonable effort to 
provide the principal with facts known to the agent that are material to the agent’s duties.    
 Less distinctively, an agent has a duty to act consistently with the express and implied 
terms of any contract with the principal.56 These terms may incorporate customs and usages of a 
particular trade. Contracts between brokers and the investors in commodities discussed above 
may impliedly incorporate the rules and customs of exchanges on which the brokers execute 
trades on behalf of customers. Likewise, and not distinctive to agency doctrine, an agent owes 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
55. For this point in the attorney-client context, see Maples v. Thomas, 565 US 266, 283 (2012)(lawyers who 
abandoned their client, a death-row inmate, ceased to represent him with consequence that now-former client not 
charged with consequences of lawyers’ failure to file timely appeal). 
 
56. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.07. 
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duties to the principal concerning the principal’s property, including a duty not to intermingle it 
with anyone else’s property, and a duty to keep and render accounts to the principal of money or 
other property received or paid out of the principal’s account.57 
 An agent’s duty is “to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by 
agents in similar circumstances.”58 That an agent’s duty encompasses competence or skill links 
the agent’s breach of duty to the jurisprudence of professional malpractice. An agent’s 
possession of special skills or knowledge, above the norm for similarly-situated agents, is 
relevant to whether the agent acted with due care and diligence under the circumstances.59 Thus, 
the diligence component of the duty, like care and competence, has operative consequences. 
Agents who claim to possess special skills or to be especially knowledgeable are held to the 
professed standard in determining whether the agent’s conduct breached the duty.60 These duties 
may overlap with an agent’s duties of performance articulated in or created by a contract with the 
principal. When an agent owes duties of performance arising out of the principal-agent 
relationship that are independent of or distinct from the agent’s contract with the principal, the 
doctrine known as the economic loss rule does not bar recovery in tort for economic losses 
suffered by the principal as a consequence of the agent’s breach of duty.61  
                                                
57. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.12. This duty also proscribes dealing with the principal’s property in a 
fashion so that it appears to be the agent’s property. Id § 8.12 (1). 
 
58. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.08. 
 
59. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.08; Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm 
§12. 
 
60. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.08. 
 
61. For recent applications of the independent-duty exception to the economic loss rule, see Lawyers Title Ins. Co. 
v. Rex Title Co., 282 F.3d 292, 294 (4th Cir. 2002)(applying Maryland law)(by issuing title insurance policy without 
obtaining release of lien on title, agent breached independent duty of care, apart from terms of written agency 
agreement); U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc. v. San Antonio Cash Network, 252 F. Supp. 3d 714 (D. Minn. 2017)(as bank’s 
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An agent’s distinctive duties of performance include a duty to act only within the scope  
of the agent’s actual authority. If an agent exceeds the bounds of authority, the agent is subject to  
liability to indemnify the principal for any loss,62 often because the agent acted with apparent 
authority to bind the principal to a transaction with a third party or the principal incurred 
litigation costs in a successful defense against a third-party claim. Relatedly, an agent has a duty, 
mentioned above, to comply with lawful instructions received from the principal. This duty is a 
distinguishing feature of agency law.63 It is integral to the principal’s power of control as well as 
to the agent’s overarching duty of loyalty to the principal, which furnishes the benchmark against 
which the agent should interpret and act upon instructions received from the principal.       
The duty to comply with instructions has bite as applied to corporate officers who, unlike 
directors, are agents of the corporation.64 In Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., the court held 
that a corporation’s CEO may have breached her fiduciary duty to the corporation by failing to 
comply with directives received from the board of directors in connection with hiring a second-
                                                                                                                                                       
agent hired to transport bank’s cash to ATMs, carrier as bank’s agent owed fiduciary duties, including duty to 
disclose all facts relevant to principal’s rights, distinct from duties created by contract); Cook v. John Hancock Life 
Ins. Co. (U.S.A.), 2015 WL 178108 *15   (W.D. Va. Jan. 14, 2015)(fiduciary duty independent of contract can arise 
when financial advisor, acting as agent for client, holds property for client). See also St. Malachy Roman Catholic 
Congregation of Geneseo v. Ingram, 841 N.W.2d 338, (Iowa 2013)(securities registered representative breached 
duty of care owed to client as representative’s principal in connection with estate-planning work; economic loss rule 
does not bar putative beneficiary’s claim against representative).    
 
62. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.09 cmt. b. 
 
63. See Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Restoring the Balance of Power in Corporate Management: Enforcing Officers’ 
Duty of Obedience, 66 Bus. Law. 27, 44-45 (2010)(characterizing duty as “peculiar to agency law”). 
 
64. As agents, officers owe duties of care, competence, and diligence, differentiating them from corporate directors, 
who have a robust statutory right to rely on officers. An officer’s liability for conduct falling short of that normally 
exercised by agents in similar circumstances should fall outside the protective ambit of the business judgment rule, 
which insulates directors from liability for conduct taken in good faith that does not breach a duty of loyalty. For the 
argument, see Deborah A. DeMott, Corporate Officers as Agents, (2017) 74 Wash.& Lee L. Rev. 847  
(2017). 
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in-command.65 Additionally, by withholding from the board material information about changes 
in the second-in-command’s compensation package, the CEO may have breached another duty 
owed by agents, which is providing the principal (here the board of directors, to whom the CEO 
reported) with facts known to the agent and material to the agent’s duties to the principal. Facts 
for this purpose, as in Amalgamated Bank, include those relevant to the agent’s own actions or 
inaction when material to the agent’s duties. The agent’s duty to provide information to the 
principal has limits: the duty applies only to facts that the agent could furnish to the principal 
without violating a superior duty owed to another person.66 Additionally, the duty is subject to 
manifestations made by the principal, such as the wish not to receive information of a particular 
type. However, in the corporate context illustrated by Amalgamated Bank, the fiduciary duties 
that directors themselves owe to the corporation impose limits on directors’ ability to insulate 
themselves from receiving facts known to senior officers.67    
 
              III.    Mutable or Immutable Duties 
 Agency doctrine melds flexibility in defining an agent’s duties with immutable elements. 
As discussed above, the fiduciary character of the agent’s relationship to the principal is 
constitutive of agency, as the Supreme Court held in Hollingsworth v. Perry. To be sure, the 
parties to a relationship are free to structure it so that neither owes a fiduciary duty to the other, 
but the result would not constitute common-law agency. Additionally, either agent or principal 
has the power to terminate the relationship at any time even if doing so constitutes a breach of 
                                                
65.132 A3d 752, 780 (Del Ch, 2016). 
 
66. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.11(2). 
 
67. On the corporate context, see Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Law, in this volume. 
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contract. Agency presupposes a condition of ongoing consent from both parties to be linked as 
agent and principal. Like a principal’s ongoing power to give interim binding instructions to an 
agent albeit in breach of an earlier contract with the agent, the parties each have the power on an 
ongoing basis to terminate their relationship.68 Thus, agency law respects and enforces the 
expression of parties’ time-inconsistent preferences to a degree that other bodies of legal doctrine 
may not. Overall, the definitional requisites of agency impose constraints on the legal efficacy of 
advance agreements between principal and agent despite the range of matters that an agreement 
may address. 
 
1. Duties of performance 
 An agent’s duties of performance may be subject to agreement with the principal. Most 
importantly, the agent’s duty to act with care, competence, and diligence may be defined through 
an agreement that specifies benchmarks or other measures of the effort to be expected from the 
agent. An agreement may also raise or lower the standard of performance applicable to the agent 
and may specify mechanisms for dispute resolution. Such an agreement may be phrased in terms 
that lack the specificity required for the principal’s consent to conduct by the agent that would 
otherwise breach the agent’s duties of loyalty, as explained below.69 Executive employment 
agreements are examples of expertly negotiated contracts that establish expectations, measures 
for performance, rewards, and sanctions. Employment agreements for CEOs, at least in public 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
68. This power is subject to contravention by statute. For an industry-specific (and unusual) example, see Md. Com. 
Law Code § 23-104 (2004), which ousts the application of the common-law rule for the hospitality industry (hotels 
and retirement communities) when an operating agreement does not permit early termination. Under Md. Com. Law 
Code § 23-104(b), specific performance is an available remedy. 
 
69. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.08 cmt b. 
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companies, commonly opt out of the common-law (and agency-law) default rule of employment 
at will by defining the circumstances that will constitute “cause” for termination and giving a 
now-former CEO greater rights against the corporation if terminated without cause.70 The 
corporation, as principal, retains its agency-law power to terminate its relationship with the CEO  
but through the agreement the parties have priced in advance the corporation’s exercise of the 
power.  
 In contrast, individualized agreement plays a less evident role in connection with agents’ 
duties to act within the scope of actual authority and to comply with lawful instructions received 
from the principal. When the agent acts beyond the scope of actual authority as defined at an 
earlier time, the principal may agree—on a going-forward basis—to expand the scope of 
authority. Indeed if the principal fails to object to the agent’s excesses, the principal’s 
acquiescence may be understood by the agent as an implied expansion of the agent’s authority.71 
If the agent’s understanding is reasonable under the circumstances, for example in light of prior 
interactions with the principal, the principal’s acquiescence has redefined and expanded the 
scope of the agent’s authority. Looking backward, however, an agent’s prior unauthorized act 
binds the principal—and does not constitute a breach of duty to the principal—only when the 
principal ratifies it. Ratification requires that the principal know the material facts about the 
agent’s action72 and in some fashion either manifest assent to the action or otherwise engage in 
                                                
 
70. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top 
Executives Bargain For?, 63 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 231 (2006). 
 
71. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.02 cmt f.  
 
72. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.06. 
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conduct that justifies a reasonable assumption that the principal has consented.73 Thus, by 
definition ratification requires historical knowledge, that is, knowledge of facts concerning 
actions already taken by the agent. These limits reflect the pervasive significance of the 
principal’s power to control the agent as a constitutive element for an agency relationship. 
Empowering an agent unilaterally to redefine the scope of the agent’s authority or unilaterally to 
determine to disregard lawful instructions received from the principal is antithetical to the 
principal’s control.  
 Relatedly, the scope of an agent’s authority controls whether the agent may delegate by 
appointing a subagent to perform functions the agent has consented to perform on behalf of the 
principal. An agent may appoint a subagent only when the agent has actual authority to do so, or 
acts with apparent authority, which requires a manifestation by the principal to third parties that 
the agent has such authority.74 This limit on delegation stems from the consensual character of an 
agency relationship and is an additional implication of the principal’s power of control, here over 
increasing the number of actors whose conduct may bind the principal.               
 
2. Duties of loyalty 
 Agency law treats an agent’s disloyal conduct differently from breaches of duties of 
performance. In particular, the law imposes substantial limits on the effectiveness of advance 
agreements between agent and principal that redefine duties of loyalty or excuse their breach. 
Only through consent to disloyal conduct does the principal “waive” the agent’s breach or lose 
                                                
73. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 4.01(2). Ratification is applicable only when the actor in question is an agent 
or has purported to act as one. See Kristensen v. Credit Payment Servs. Inc., 879 F.3d 1010, __ (9th Cir. 2018). 
 
74. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 3.15(2). 
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the right to seek remedies against the agent for breach. In this context, consent resembles the 
formulation in tort law, which requires willingness in fact—or at least apparent willingness in 
fact—that an act shall occur.75 Agency law requires specificity for legally operative consent to an 
agent’s conduct that otherwise would breach a duty of loyalty, in particular that the principal 
know all material facts known to the agent unless the principal has manifested uninterest in 
knowing them.76 The principal’s consent, if not confined to a specific act or transaction, is 
legally effective only as applied to acts or transactions of some specified type that could 
reasonably be expected to occur in ordinary course in the principal’s relationship with the 
agent.77 In obtaining the principal’s consent, the agent has a duty to act in good faith and 
otherwise deal fairly with the principal. 
 Apart from transactions of a specified type, agency doctrine defines consent in terms that 
are closely allied to the doctrine of ratification, discussed above. The requirement that a 
principal’s consent be informed by knowledge of all material facts known to the agent lends 
consent a retrospective cast comparable to that associated with ratification.         
    
       IV. Remedies for Breach of Duty 
 Following an agent’s breach of a fiduciary duty, several distinct routes toward remedies 
                                                
75. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 10A (defining ‘consent’ as ‘willingness in fact that an act or invasion of an 
interest shall take place’). 
 
76. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.06 (1)(a)(ii). For a recent application, see Sacramento EDM, Inc. v. Hynes, 
2017 WL 1383289 at * 28 (E.D. Cal, Mar. 18, 2017)(misrepresentation by agent of interest rates and other terms 
associated with leases in which agent had personal interest vitiated effectiveness of principal’s consent to lease 
transactions). 
 
77. Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.06 (1)(b). 
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may be open to the principal.78 For starters, the self-help response of terminating the relationship 
with the agent may prove wise, regardless of its legal aftermath. If the principal has a contract 
with the agent requiring that the agent be given notice of any breaches and an opportunity to cure 
them prior to termination, the notice-and-cure provision would not encompass breaches that are 
not curable, which could encompass breaches of duties of loyalty.79 And the agent’s breach of 
fiduciary duty may furnish a basis on which the principal may avoid a contract with a third party 
or, for that matter, with the agent.80 
 When an agent’s breach of duty causes loss to the principal, the breach subjects the agent 
to liability to the principal, a long-established principle within tort law that places breaches of 
fiduciary duty on comparable remedial footing with other wrongs—such as fraud—for loss 
caused to the principal.81 Additionally, the long-standing taxonomic placement of breach of 
fiduciary duty within tort law makes relevant tort principles of contribution among joint 
tortfeasors.82 Separately, when through a breach of fiduciary duty an agent realizes a material 
benefit, the law of restitution and unjust enrichment imposes a duty on the agent to account to the 
principal, often termed a duty to disgorge gain stemming from the breach of duty.83  
 Overarching these specific remedies is a general principle of agency doctrine, which 
                                                
78. For remedies more generally, see Samuel L. Bray, Fiduciary Remedies, in this volume. 
 
79. See Larken, Inc. v. Larken Iowa City P’ship, 589 N.W.2d 700, 704 (Iowa 1998). 
 
80. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 163. 
 
81. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 (defining breach of fiduciary duty as a tort). 
 
82. For a recent example, see In re Rural/Metro S’holders Litig., 102 A.3d 205 (Del. Ch. 2014), aff’d, 129 A.3d 816 
(Del. 2015). 
 
83. Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 43(a)(liability in restitution for benefit obtained in 
breach of fiduciary duty). 
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forecloses an escape route that may occur to agents and their counsel. As noted above, a 
principal is generally charged with knowledge of facts known to the agent that are material to the 
agent’s duties to the principal. Indeed, in some settings beyond the scope of this Chapter, 
doctrines associated with imputed knowledge have complex and wide-reaching consequences.84 
An agent might be tempted to argue that the rule of imputed knowledge applies in the context of 
claims the principal may assert against the agent, perhaps treating the principal’s imputed 
knowledge of the agent’s wrongdoing as a bridge toward establishing the principal’s 
acquiescence or complicity in the agent’s breach of duty. In Zendejas v. Redman, the principal 
retained an agent to locate a suitable horse for his son, a championship rider. The agent withheld 
material information concerning the history of the horse (“Vorst”) he sourced, as well as the fact 
that he was also acting as the sales agent of Vorst’s owner.85 After Vorst proved untrainable and 
flawed in other material respects, the principal’s claims against the agent included negligent 
misrepresentation. The agent argued that the principal could not establish that he justifiably 
relied on the agent’s statements about Vorst because he was, as principal, charged with knowing 
facts known to the agent. Unsurprisingly, the court rejected the agent’s imputed-knowledge 
argument on the basis that imputation doctrine does not apply to claims between principal and 
agent and operates only to protect third parties who deal with the principal through the agent.86    
                                                
84. For a good introduction, see Harry S Bryans, Claims against Lawyers by Bankruptcy Trustees: A First Course on 
the In Pari Delicto Doctrine, 66 Bus. Law. 587 (2011).   
 
85. 2016 WL 1242349 (S.D. Fla, Mar. 30, 2016). 
 
86. 2016 WL 1242349 at *7; accord, Restatement (Third) of Agency § 5.03 cmt b. For some courts, this basic 
principle may operate less strongly in the context of claims asserted by bankruptcy trustees when an agent’s 
uncontroverted breach of duty was not wholly adverse to the principal’s interests. See In re Lehr Constr. Corp., 551 
B.R. 732 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 666 Fed. App’x 66 (2d Cir. 2016)(employee may assert in pari delicto defense against 
bankruptcy trustee for former employer; employee’s participation in fraudulent overbilling scheme, although it 
generated personal benefits for employee, was not entirely adverse to employer).  
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 More controversially, an agent’s breach of a duty of loyalty is also a basis on which the 
principal may seek forfeiture of commissions or other compensation paid or payable to the agent 
during the period of disloyalty. Forfeiture is not limited to use as a defense or an offset when an 
agent asserts a claim for compensation. Forfeiture may confer something of a windfall on a 
principal when the principal has benefitted through the agent’s work, albeit flawed by disloyalty. 
On the other hand, forfeiture may be the sole plausible remedy when the agent has realized no 
benefit through disloyalty and the principal cannot prove any loss. Measured as it is by amounts 
paid or due the agent, forfeiture is determinable at lower costs to litigants and adjudicatory 
forums than other remedies may be. And forfeiture’s potential to deter disloyalty is evident, as is 
the possibility that the threat of a forfeiture claim may chill former employees’ assertion of rights 
against their now-former employer. Recent authority treats the remedy as discretionary, not a 
mandatory consequence of an agent’s breach of fiduciary duty.87 
 A more technical question in some cases is how to define the relevant period of 
disloyalty: over an interval of time, or on a task-specific basis. In Phansalkar v. Anderson 
Weinroth & Co., an advisor and deal-facilitator employed by a small investment bank worked on 
four transactions for the bank during his last eighteen months with the bank, in three transactions 
accepting investment opportunities for his personal account without the bank’s consent.88 
Relying on the fact that the bank did not compensate the advisor on a deal-by-deal basis, the 
court held that the appropriate measure of compensation was the time interval over which 
disloyalty occurred. Additionally, the advisor was subject to liability to the bank for the profits 
                                                
87. Wall Sys., Inc. v. Pompa, 154 A.3d 989, 1001 (Conn. 2017), relying on Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.01 
cmt. (d)(2). Some cases treat forfeiture as mandatory, as did Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 403, 469 (1958), 
discussed in Pompa at 1000-1001.  
 
88. 344 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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he made through the investment opportunities or property he obtained; both represented material 
benefits received in breach of fiduciary duty.  
  
     IV. Conclusion 
 The common law treats agency relationships as categorical instances for the application 
of fiduciary duties. Nonetheless, agents may not be the prototypes that motivate theoretical 
accounts of fiduciary law, at least in part because the common-law definition requires that an 
agent be subject to the principal’s control. As this Chapter demonstrates, the fiduciary character 
of the relationship is well established as a constitutive or necessary element of the relationship. 
The complexity of agency doctrine, implicating as it does externally-oriented consequences of 
representation as well as internally-oriented relations between principal and agent, follows as a 
consequence.     
 
